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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1932, the Japanese military established its first "comfort sta-
tion" in Shanghai.' For the next decade, the government built
countless more brothels in and around its military stations all over
Asia, euphemistically calling these dens of government-licensed
rape "comfort stations" and their victims jfagun ianfu, or "military
comfort women." 2 Approximately 200,000 girls and women were
forced to serve as the sexual slaves of the entire Japanese military,3
but less than thirty percent of them are still alive.4 Astonishingly,
Japan has never been held accountable for its unspeakable crimes
in any court of law.5 In fact, the government initially denied any
involvement with the comfort stations and claimed that they were
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1997,
University of Pennsylvania. Many thanks to Farah Schwartz for her dedicated
work on this Comment and to the 2002-2003 Board of JIEL for always incorporat-
ing humanity and humor into hard work. Writing this Comment, like getting to
and through law school, would not have been possible without the love and sup-
port of my family and friends.
I YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI, COMFORT WOMEN 43 (Suzanne O'Brien trans., Columbia
University Press 2000) (1995).
2 Id. at23.
3 Women's International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial of Japan's
Military Sexual Slavery [hereinafter Women's Tribunal], at http://home.att.ne.jp
/star/tribunal/jedgement-e.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
4 Maki Arakawa, A New Forum for Comfort Women: Fighting Japan in the United
States Federal Court, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 174, 180 (2001).
5 See discussion infra § 4.
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privately-operated brothels.6 For years, Japan was able to sustain
this lie because it had destroyed or concealed evidence that would
reveal the truth.7 Only after irrefutable documents surfaced expos-
ing the government's role in the recruitment, establishment, and
operation of the comfort stations, did Japan accept moral responsi-
bility.8 Deplorably, Japan has yet to accept legal responsibility, and
no court has vindicated the comfort women by imposing it.
On September 18, 2000, fifteen former comfort women brought
their struggle against Japan to the United States, hoping that the
District of Columbia ("D.C.") District Court would finally hold Ja-
pan liable for its crimes against humanity. However, with the
Bush Administration's support, Japan prevailed; the case was dis-
missed.9 This Comment provides an overview of the comfort
women's plight for justice and their recent attempt to find it in the
United States. Section 2 provides a brief history of the comfort sta-
tion system. Section 3 examines the dishonest and inconsistent re-
sponses of the Japanese government regarding its role in creating
this system of military sexual slavery. It also discusses the posi-
tions of other States regarding comfort women's issues and Japan's
reaction to the international community. Section 4 analyzes the
violations of international law Japan committed by establishing the
comfort station system. Section 5 reviews the minimal comfort
women's litigation to date, and Section 6 details Hwang v. Japan,o
the case that brought the comfort women's claims to the federal
courts of the United States. In particular, it reviews the plaintiffs'
claims, Japan's defenses, and the Bush Administration's support of
Japan's motion to dismiss. The U.S. State Department urged the
D.C. District Court to dismiss the comfort women's complaint
against Japan, asserting that it presented a political question that
precluded adjudication." Though this Comment does not dispute
that foreign policy is constitutionally outside the bounds of the ju-
diciary's scope, it does question the State Department's position
that past treaties settled the comfort women's claims against Japan
and suggests that U.S. economic interests, not adherence to inter-
national law, motivated the Bush Administration's support.
6 See discussion infra § 3.1.
7 See infra text accompanying and sources cited notes 71-72.
8 See infra text accompanying and sources cited notes 78-83.
9 See discussion infra § 6.2.
10 Hwang v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001).
11 See discussion infra § 6.2.
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2. THE COMFORT STATION SYSTEM
For the Japanese military, sex was as much a necessity as muni-
tions or food. Superstitiously, the military believed having sex be-
fore combat worked as a "charm against injury."' 2 Furthermore,
sex served as a relief from the stress of combat and as a source of
liberation from the strict confines of military service,13 since sol-
diers were stationed in fields far from home for long periods of
time, mistreated by their commanding officers, and granted inade-
quate vacation time.' 4 Conversely, sex became a major problem for
the Japanese military as well. Soldiers became infected with sexu-
ally transmitted diseases with increasing frequency after visiting
brothels, causing entire troops to be immobilized by illness at
times. 5 They also raped local women in the territories they occu-
pied, a fact the Imperial Army found to be embarrassingly harmful
to its reputation.' 6 To serve as the solution to'these problems, the
military created comfort stations in and around their bases. The
stations enabled the military to control the soldiers' sexual activi-
ties and partners and provide medical examinations and treatment
to the comfort women for sexually transmitted diseases before they
could infect the soldiers. Additionally, using comfort women to
satisfy soldiers' sexual needs would, in theory, curb the incidence
of rape.' 7
After starting with a few stations in China, in the late 1930s the
Japanese military began expanding the comfort station system
throughout its territories, including Manchuria, Taiwan, Borneo,
the Philippines, Singapore, Burma, Indonesia, Japan, and Korea,18
12 GEORGE HICKS, THE COMFORT WOMEN: JAPAN'S BRUTAL REGIME OF ENFORCED
PROSTITUTION IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR 32 (1994).
13 See id. at 32-33 (noting that Japanese troops endured particularly savage
discipline).
14 YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 72-73.
15 See id. at 65-72 (discussing the two main goals in creating the comfort sta-
tions: to curb the rampant looting and raping committed by the troops in the oc-
cupied territories, and to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases that
threatened the health of soldiers).
16 See id.
17 Id. at 65-68. This logic assumes that rape is caused by frustrated sexual de-
sire or a lack of sexual activity and fails to recognize rape as a crime of violence
and an assertion of power.
18 See Arakawa, supra note 4, at 177-78 (noting the locations of comfort sta-
tions and the rationale of the Japanese government for the comfort system); Susan
Jenkins Vanderweert, Comment, Seeking Justice for "Comfort" Women: Without an
International Criminal Court, Suits Brought by World War II Sex Slaves of the Japanese
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and, for a small fee, provided soldiers with the right to rape more
than 200,000 women over the course of the next decade.
2.1. Recruitment and Service
Comfort women were usually very young girls between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen.1 9 They were generally uneducated
and from poor rural families. 20 Eighty percent of the comfort
women were Korean, 21 but Taiwanese, Chinese, Southeast Asian,
Filipina, and European women were also used in the stations.22
Japanese women served in the stations as well; but this was rare,
and they were usually older, working prostitutes.23 The govern-
ment frowned upon the use of Japanese women in comfort stations
because they were the potential mothers of Japan's future loyal
subjects.24 In addition, the government assumed soldiers would
lose trust in the State and the army if they discovered that their sis-
ters, wives, or female acquaintances were on the battlefields as
comfort women.25 Therefore, women in Japanese-occupied territo-
ries, who presented no such issues and often did not need to be
Army May Find Their Best Hope of Success in U.S. Federal Courts, 27 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 141, 149 (2001) (describing the development of the system).
19 See Vanderweert, supra note 18, at 150 (describing the age range and social
status of the "women"); Rita M. Gerona-Adkins, Demonstrators Bash Bush Support
for Japan in 'Comfort Women' Suit, ASIAN FORTUNE (stating that some comfort
women were girls as young as ten years old), available at http://www.asian
fortune.com/SeptOl/Comfort%20women.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
20 Vanderweert, supra note 18, at 150.
21 Chunghee Sarah Soh, The Comfort Women Project, at http://online.sfsu.edu
/-soh/cornfortwomen.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2003). It is likely that Korean
women comprised the largest percentage of comfort women because they were
preferred by the soldiers over women of other ethnicities. This is partly due to the
fact that as part of its colonization of Korea, Japan imposed Japanese as the official
language, so Korean comfort women could understand the Japanese soldiers.
Also, since the Japanese government controlled Korea, it could more easily get
cooperation from local Korean officials and police in rounding up girls. YOSHIAKI,
supra note 1, at 107-08, 121.
22 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 178; Vanderweert, supra note 18, at 150.
23 Because Japan was a signatory to an international treaty that forbade the
selling and trafficking of women and children, police regulations specified that
Japanese women had to be over the age of twenty-one and a prostitute to be taken
overseas as a comfort woman. YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 100.
24 See Arakawa, supra note 4, at 178 (describing Japan's racial and ethnic atti-
tudes and motivations).
25 YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 155.
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transported far distances, became the logical target for the mili-
tary's recruitment efforts.
Some comfort women were prostitutes that volunteered to
serve in the comfort stations. They accepted the military's offer to
continue their work on military bases in exchange for relief from
debts and to obtain secure wages.26 But as the War in the Pacific
progressed and Japan intensified its efforts by adding more sol-
diers to the fields, the small number of actual prostitutes could
hardly meet the sexual needs of the entire Imperial Army. The
military initially amassed its supply of sex slaves by using decep-
tion to recruit women under the pretext that they would receive
high wages from jobs in factories or military bases and have access
to education.2 7 Extreme poverty coupled with a general devalua-
tion of women even led some parents and husbands to sell their
daughters or wives to procurers working for the military.28 How-
ever, when even these measures failed to yield a sufficient number
of women, the government took more drastic measures to replen-
ish the comfort stations' inventory. With the help of local school-
teachers, officials, and police, the Japanese military raided villages
and abducted unaccompanied young girls or kidnapped them
from their homes.29 Families who tried to prevent the kidnapping
of their daughters were violently overpowered. 30 In extreme cases,
soldiers raped girls in front of their families, knowing that raped
26 In order to recruit Japanese prostitutes or geishas, the military paid off the
women's debts to their brothel owners and treated the comfort women as civilian
employees. Id. at 101. "There was also a psychological bonus: women who were
usually despised were now admired for their courage in moving to a war zone,
enabling them to think of themselves as patriotic." HIcKs, supra note 12, at 39.
27 See HICKs, supra note 12, at 49 (pointing out that poverty and scarcity of
jobs in rural areas made "deceptive offers of well-paid work [sound] attractive
and provided sufficient lure"); YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 103-04 (stating that cases
of deception were most common in Korea where poor, uneducated girls were eas-
ily lured by the appeal of money and education).
28 See YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 105-06 (detailing cases in which women testi-
fied to being sold by their parents or their husbands to Japanese procurers or an
"employment agency").
29 See Arakawa, supra note 4, at 178-79 (describing Japanese slave raids).
30 Report on the Mission to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic
of Korea and Japan on the Issue of Military Sexual Slavery in Wartime, U.N. ESCOR,
52nd Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 9(a), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.1
(1996) [hereinafter Coomaraswamy Report], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/b6ad5f3990967f3e802566d600575fcb?Open
document (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
2003]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
daughters were less desirable to the families, and they would
therefore be less likely to resist their abductions.31
A document entitled "Matters Concerning the Recruitment of
Women to Work in Military Comfort Stations" issued on March 4,
1938, by the Ministry of War confirms that the Japanese govern-
ment was not only involved in the recruitment of comfort women,
but was completely aware of the illegal tactics often used in the
process.32 This document, drafted by the Military Administration
Section of the Military Administration Bureau, states:
In recruiting women domestically to work in the military
comfort stations ... it is feared that some people have
claimed to be acting with the military's consent and have
damaged the honor of the army, inviting the misunder-
standing of the general public .... There have also been in-
stances where a lack of proper consideration resulted in the
selection of inappropriate people to round up women, peo-
ple who kidnap women and are arrested by the police.
There are many things [about the rounding up of comfort
women] that require careful attention. In the future, armies
in the field will control the recruiting of women and will
use scrupulous care in selecting people to carry out this
task. This task will be performed in close cooperation with
the military police or local police force of the area. You are
hereby notified of the order [of the Ministry of War] to
carry out this task with the utmost regard for preserving
the honor of the army and for avoiding social problems. 33
Here, the Ministry of War does censure the "rounding up of
women" by means of kidnap. However, its concern is not for the
human rights of the women being kidnapped or the illegality of
the acts involved. This notice seems to be prompted only by the
desire to curb negative publicity. In assigning control over the re-
cruitment of comfort women to the military, it is important to no-
tice that the final order is to preserve the army's honor and avoid
public problems. It does not actually prohibit kidnapping or illegal
31 Id. para. 16.
32 YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 58-59.
33 Id.
[24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/4
COMFORTING THE COMFORT WOMEN
acts; it merely suggests that such behavior must remain undetected
in order to maintain the army's image. If the Ministry's aim was to
stop the kidnappings themselves, then surely the order would
have stated so, and 1938 would have marked the end of forced re-
cruitment. Instead, the military, with the help of local police and
civilians, continued to use violence and kidnapping to round up
women,34 suggesting that the Ministry's underlying message was,
"don't get caught, and we won't ask."
Once the comfort women arrived at the stations, they quickly
realized the type of "work" they would be required to perform.
Many women had to serve sixty to seventy men per day.35 In addi-
tion to raping the comfort women, soldiers often beat, stabbed, or
subjected comfort women to other torturous acts for no apparent
reason,36 and any attempt to escape from the stations or resist the
soldiers usually resulted in severe physical torture. 37 The military
controlled every aspect of the comfort women's lives, including
their ability to die by removing suicide from their options. The
army deterred suicide and secured submission by threatening to
injure the comfort women's families if they disobeyed commands
or tried to kill themselves.38
Officers and soldiers were required to pay station operators for
comfort women's services according to a system of fees devised by
the military, and, in theory, station operators were to pay the
women for their labor from these fees.39 Instead, operators charged
the women for their upkeep and deducted these fees from the
34 See generally id. at 98-115 (describing the various means used to recruit and
forcefully abduct young girls and women to serve in the comfort stations).
35 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 34.
36 See HicKs, supra note 12, at 62-63 (quoting the testimony of one comfort
woman whose client "drew his sword and began tracing its point on her flesh");
Carlin Meyer, Crimes Against Humanity Women: The Uncomfortable Stories of "Com-
fort Women," 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. Ris. 1019, 1025 (2001) (book review) ("Dis-
pleased 'customers' beat, stabbed and otherwise injured the women with impu-
nity.").
37 See Arakawa, supra note 4, at 179 (describing physical scars attributed to
beatings and torture for attempts to resist or escape).
38 When comfort women protested to soldiers by saying they would rather
die than submit, the Japanese responded by threatening to make their families
suffer. HICKS, supra note 12, at 62. Whether soldiers would have actually carried
out these threats or not, the comfort women knew firsthand the violence of which
they were capable and unwillingly submitted.
39 See HicKs, supra note 12, at 83-85, 91 (detailing the varying systems of pay-
ments and fees at different comfort stations and stating that the fees differentiated
both for military rank and for nationality of the women).
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earnings or refused to issue payments to them. 4° The women who
did receive payment often deposited the cash in military savings
accounts, only to have their money confiscated by the Japanese
government at the end of World War 11.41 Not surprisingly, most
comfort women saw little or none of the earnings; they were de
facto slaves.
2.2. Government Regulation of Comfort Stations
Although there are few remaining records about the recruit-
ment of comfort women,42 much documentation about the man-
agement and operation of the comfort stations survived. These re-
cords indicate that the comfort stations were strictly regulated by
the government and, initially, directly operated by the military.43
As stations became more established, the trend became one in
which private operators were responsible for the internal opera-
tions of comfort stations, while the military retained overall super-
vision through an elaborate system of regulations and provided
transport and health services.44
The military determined each comfort station's rules regarding
hygiene, hours of operation, payments for sexual service, use of
condoms, and prohibition of alcohol and weapons. 4 The govern-
ment also administered medical services for women at all the sta-
tions, including routine exams, treatment for sexually transmitted
diseases and pregnancy, and provision of contraceptives. 46 Finally,
the military provided security for the comfort stations to prevent
40 See id. at 92 (explaining that operators charged exploitative rates for up-
keep and were generally deceptive or callous in keeping comfort women's earn-
ings); Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 36 ("Though in nearly all cases
the women were supposed to have been paid for their 'services' and collected
tickets in lieu of the pay they were due, only very few saw any 'earnings' at the
end of the war.").
41 HICKS, supra note 12, at 92.
42 See HIcKs, supra note 12, at 49 (stating that the Japanese systematically de-
stroyed all documentation about the recruitment process for comfort stations and
confidential material that could be used as evidence in war crime trials at the end
of the war); Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 19 (attributing the lack of
remaining or disclosed documentation to why it has been difficult to write an ac-
count of the recruitment for the comfort stations).
43 HicKs, supra note 12, at 46-47.
44 Id.
45 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 128.
46 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 180.
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women from escaping and unauthorized men from entering.47 De-
spite the detailed regulations, the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases, violence, and alcohol use in the stations indicate that
there was little attention paid to the enforcement of rules.48 After
having forced so many women into service, the military never cre-
ated laws for their protection49 and the mere posting of informal
rules on the doors of the comfort stations had little impact. The ex-
istence of this extensive scheme of regulations is important,
though, in that it is persuasive evidence that comfort women were
an integrated part of the Japanese military and "subjected to the to-
talitarian 'national defence [sic] state. '"'50
2.3. Disposed and Discarded After the War
It is estimated that less than thirty percent of all the comfort
women are still alive today.5' Many women died in the comfort
stations. If the brutality of their work did not kill them, the vio-
lence of war on the front lines, illness, or soldiers angered by dis-
obedience did. More died at the end of the war when the Japanese
soldiers killed themselves and forced the comfort women to also
commit suicide rather than submit to enemy capture.52 Of the com-
fort women that survived the stations and the war, only the Japa-
nese women were returned to their native land.53 Women from
other countries generally were abandoned wherever their stations
were located.54 Although freed from the stations, being stranded in
remote areas of Southeast Asia, vulnerable to the elements and
without means of returning home, was no salvation.55
47 Id.
48 See HicKs, supra note 12, at 90 (quoting a police report sent to warn comfort
station operators to improve their standards: "Many managers are interested in
nothing but their own profit and do their job with no other purpose. They exhibit
no concern for the welfare of the geisha ... .
49 YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 151.
50 HICKS, supra note 12, at 90.
51 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 180.
52 See id. at 180; HIcKS, supra note 12, at 153 (explaining that an honorable
death was considered better than a dishonorable life, so troops with this belief
preferred that their women share such a death by committing suicide).
53 YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 192.
54 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 21.
55 See HICKS, supra note 12, at 156 (describing how the abandoned comfort
women had no suitable clothing and had to live off and eat what they could find
in the jungle, including palms, lizards, and dead bodies). Because Korea was not
an active war zone, military presence there was minimal and, correspondingly, so
20031
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
A considerable number of women returned home or tried to
start new lives in new locations, but the trauma of living in the
comfort stations was replaced by the unending physical and psy-
chological trauma of having survived them. Aside from the physi-
cal injuries that may have eventually healed, former comfort
women have been diagnosed with the long-term effects of sexually
transmitted diseases: sterility and infertility, complications from
hysterectomies, insomnia, nervous diseases, and mental illnesses
such as severe post-traumatic stress disorder and depression.
56
Moreover, healing psychologically proved to be a much harder
task than healing physically. Instead of receiving sympathy and
support, Asian society's patriarchal views of chastity and moral-
ity57 further oppressed the comfort women. Many women felt
forced to remain silent about their experiences, believing they
would be ostracized or possibly beaten to death by family mem-
bers if they revealed the truth.5 8 This belief was reasonable in light
of the fact that families who knew their daughters and wives had
been comfort women did reject and torment them.5 9 Consequently,
silence perpetuated the women's pain by precluding the possibility
of "find[ing] release in an open acknowledgement of the wrong
done to them."60 Thus, having survived the comfort stations and
the war, some women were unable to face their own shame and
took their own lives upon returning home.61
was the number of comfort stations. However, since most of the comfort women
were Korean, they comprised the largest group that was displaced after the war.
HICKS, supra note 12, at 48.
%6 See HICKS, supra note 12, at 165 ("Sometimes they had been sterilised [sic]
by the operations done on them to eliminate menstruation, keeping them always
available."); YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 193; Arakawa, supra note 4, at 180 (describ-
ing the long-term psychological, physiological, and emotional damage sustained
by the women).
57 See HICKS, supra note 12, at 165 ("The view that a raped woman is a defiled
woman dies hard everywhere in Asia.").
58 YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 196.
59 See id. at 196 (quoting the testimony of comfort women who said that their
families called them "filthy" and treated them as if they had a "contagious dis-
ease").
60 HICKS, supra note 12, at 165.
61 See Arakawa, supra note 4, at 180 (describing the ostracism of comfort
women and resulting suicides during and after the war).
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3. RESPONSES TO THE COMFORT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT
Given that eighty percent of the comfort women were Korean,
it would have been reasonable to expect the North or South Korean
government to seek redress from Japan for establishing the comfort
station system and injuring its nationals. However, when the Al-
lied Forces and South Korea negotiated treaties with Japan to end
the war and settle matters of compensation for wartime suffering
following World War II and the Korean War,62 the issue of comfort
women never made it to the bargaining tables.63
With a series of military men at the helm of repressive re-
gimes, and the Korean War to deal with in the 1950s and
1960s, comfort women were not a priority. The fact that
many of the Korean women pressed into sexual service by
the Japanese came from the poorer lower classes possibly
made the issue insignificant to the ruling elite.64
When the Korean governments failed to demand justice on
their behalf, comfort women did not then take matters into their
own hands. They felt silenced by Asian cultural norms,65 and this
prevented them from suing the Japanese government on their own.
Filing a suit would require a former comfort woman to publicly
admit to having been a sex slave. The lack of civil litigation against
Japan following the war indicates that this was not something that
any comfort woman was willing to do. Thus, when the South Ko-
rean government neglected to raise the comfort women issue in its
treaty negotiations with Japan in 1965, the matter was effectively
tabled.66
62 Although Korea was not a party to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty,
which ended the war between the Allies and Japan, this treaty did restore Korean
sovereignty. Finally, in 1965, the Japanese-South Korean Basic Treaty was signed,
giving the South Korean government the right to handle wartime compensation.
HicKs, supra note 12, at 169-70.
63 Id. at 171-72.
64 Id. at 172.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 57-59.
66 See HicKs, supra note 12, at 172-73 (explaining that the low status of women
and the acceptance of rape as a part of war were responsible for the failure to ad-
dress the comfort women's abuse until the 1980s).
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3.1. Japan Denies Establishing Comfort Stations
In the late 1980s, influenced by feminist thought, South Korean
women's groups began to take action on the comfort women is-
sue.67 Activists demonstrated, traveled to Japan in order to gather
more information about the comfort station system, and demanded
an apology from Japan.68 However, without the initiation of legal
action by comfort women or the release of conclusive evidence of
the government's involvement in the comfort stations, the activists
made little impact.69 The Japanese government denied involve-
ment in the comfort station system. Insisting that they were pri-
vately-operated brothels, it refused to disclose any information
about the stations or accept responsibility.70 Unfortunately, this
was difficult to refute due to the lack of official documents that
supported surviving comfort women's accounts of coercive re-
cruitment and forced sexual labor.71 Most records had been de-
stroyed and the Japanese government had not disclosed that there
were any documents remaining in its possession.72 Thus, survi-
vors' narratives comprised the bulk of the body of evidence re-
garding the comfort stations.73 Quite literally adding insult to in-
jury, "the government also dismissed the testimonies of survivors
recounting kidnapping, coercion, and forced transport by Japanese
military personnel as uncorroborated and therefore insufficient
evidence of military participation." 74
67 Id.
68 See id. at 177-78 (describing investigative trips made to Japan and women's
groups' actions).
69 See id. at 186 ("[Tlhe Japanese reply was that there was no evidence of the
forced draft of Korean women. So no public apology, disclosures or memorial
were forthcoming.").
70 See Arakawa, supra note 4, at 181 (describing the Japanese government's
response to the comfort women issue).
71 See HICKS, supra note 12, at 49 (explaining that it has been difficult to get a
clear picture of the recruitment process in Korea due to "the shortage of official
records of draft procedures," which is the result of systematic destruction by the
Japanese of all confidential material that could have been used as evidence in war
crimes); Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 19.
72 Suzanne O'Brien, Translator's Introduction to YOSHIMI YOSHIAKI, COMFORT
WOMEN 1, 7 (Suzanne O'Brien trans., Columbia University Press 2000) (1995).
73 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 19.
74 O'Brien, supra note 72, at 7.
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3.2. Japan Unwillingly Admits the Truth but Denies Responsibility
In the early 1990s, two important events catalyzed Japan's
eventual admission of involvement in the comfort station system
and the investigation by international bodies into the system. First,
in 1991, Kim Hak-sun announced her willingness to testify publicly
about her experiences as a comfort woman and became the first
surviving comfort woman to initiate formal legal action against the
Japanese government.75 Her decision was prompted by Japan's
denials of responsibility and her lack of immediate family; 76 she
would testify only because there was no one left in her life that
would have to suffer the shame that would result from the revela-
tion of her past. Soon after Kim Hak-sun went public, two other
former comfort women, who chose to remain anonymous, agreed
to join her suit against Japan.77
The second major event occurred when Professor Yoshimi Yo-
shiaki, a Japanese history professor, provided the comfort women
with the gift of irrefutable proof of the military's direct role in es-
tablishing and running the comfort stations.78
Deeply moved by the courageous testimony of Korean
comfort station survivor Kim Hak-sun, in January 1992 Yo-
shimi returned to the Japanese Self-Defense Agency ar-
chives, where he had previously come across documents
pertaining to the comfort station system. There he located
wartime documents attesting to the fact that the Japanese
military planned, constructed, and operated comfort sta-
tions.79
On January 11, 1992, Professor Yoshiaki published these docu-
ments in the Asahi Shimbun, a major Japanese newspaper.80 That
day, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Koichi Kato responded by
apologizing for the first time on behalf of the government for the
military's involvement in the comfort stations, but refused to pay
75 HicKs, supra note 12, at 188.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 190.
78 Id. at 197.
79 O'Brien, supra note 72, at 7.
80 Id.
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damages. 81 His apology, however, was tenuous at best. He admit-
ted that the military had constructed the stations, conducted medi-
cal examinations, and overseen the management of the comfort fa-
cilities, but he claimed civilians, and not the military, had recruited
and transported the comfort women,82 denying the alleged use of
coercion or force. According to Kato, the women were voluntary
prostitutes, not sexual slaves, thus the system was not illegal and
Japan had no legal liability.
Finally in 1993, in response to mounting evidence of the mili-
tary's role in the recruitment and transportation of comfort
women, Japan again reversed its position by admitting that the
military had been officially involved in the comfort station system
and that the women had indeed been coerced by deceit and in-
timidation into forced sexual labor.83 Nevertheless, Japan refused
to acknowledge any legal responsibility, claiming that war treaties
and agreements barred liability and waived reparations.84
Subsequently, in an attempt to appease former comfort women
and international critics, Japan established the Asian Women's
Fund ("AWF") in 1995 with "the aim of expressing a sense of na-
tional atonement from the Japanese people to the former 'comfort
women' and to work to address contemporary issues regarding the
honor and dignity of women." 85 The $1 billion program is alleg-
edly privately-financed and managed by the Japanese Red Cross
Society to undertake cultural and vocational projects and to pro-
81 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 181.
82 O'Brien, supra note 72, at 7. Professor Yoshiaki explains how these docu-
ments were spared from destruction:
They were among a group of documents... that had been stored in an
underground warehouse... to protect them from U.S. air raids. They
were scheduled for incineration in the final days of the war, but the arri-
val of the Allied Forces preempted that plan. The documents were
seized by the Allied Forces and brought to the United States, then later
returned to the Self-Defense Agency's National Institute for Defense
Studies Library. No one knew that this collection contained documents
relating to the comfort women, so they were overlooked.
YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 35.
83 Meyer, supra note 36, at 1030-31.
84 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 182.
85 See Chunghee Sarah Soh, Human Rights and Humanity: The Case of the
"Comfort Women," (1998) [hereinafter Soh, Human Rights] (Institute for Corean-
American Studies, Inc. Lecture No. 98-1204-CSSb) (quoting statements from the
Asian Women's Fund), at http://www.icasinc.org/lectures/css/1998.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2003).
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vide lump sum "tokens of apology" of up to $10,000 to former
comfort women.86 The emphasis on private-financing is significant
because substantial government contributions would, in effect,
convert AWF funds into disguised reparations, and this would un-
dermine Japan's position that comfort women are not entitled to
reparations. While the government states that it will limit its con-
tribution to the nominal costs of public relations and clerical ex-
penses, 7 one report claims that it also contributes directly to the
AWF under the name of a ghost company.88
3.3. International Criticism of Japan
In general, the AWF has drawn more criticism than acclaim.
Japan created the AWF to improve its public image regarding its
position on comfort women's issues, but the AWF has had the op-
posite effect. By stressing that the funds are private contributions
and refusing, at least publicly, to make substantial State contribu-
tions, Japan has only further angered comfort women advocates.
For them, the central issue is not one of money, but of justice and
atonement, neither of which are achieved by Japan's offering of
"private" funds. The AWF functions as a means for the State to of-
ficially reject legal responsibility and not pay reparations while at-
tempting to appease.89 Thus, many former comfort women, lead-
ers of the comfort women movement, and governments have
rejected AWF money and asked Japan to withdraw the AWE.
In Taiwan, for example, movement leaders and the government
have officially rejected the AWF, asking instead for Japan's formal
apology and legal compensation for the violations of the comfort
women's human rights.90 Similarly, the North Korean government
has requested that Japan accept full responsibility under interna-
tional law for the comfort stations, formally apologize, pay com-
86 Tong Yu, Reparations for Former Comfort Women of World War II, 36 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 528, 529-30 (1995).
87 Id.
88 Soh, Human Rights, supra note 85.
89 Id. See Yu, supra note 86, at 530 (stating that critics are troubled by the fact
that by not making direct compensation, the Japanese government avoids assum-
ing legal responsibility); Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 134 ("[Tihe
Special Rapporteur sees the Fund, as created, as an expression of the Japanese
Government's moral concern for the fate of 'comfort women.' However, it is a
clear statement denying legal responsibility.., and this is reflected in... the de-
sire to raise funds from the private sector.").
90 Soh, Human Rights, supra note 85.
20031
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
pensation to each individual surviving woman, and identify and
prosecute under national law all those involved in establishing the
comfort station system.91 It has further requested the release of all
remaining documents and materials about the comfort women and
the modification of Japanese history books to accurately reflect the
government's crimes.92
The South Korean government has taken a more cautious ap-
proach. Although it has conceded that its 1965 treaty with Japan
only settled claims for property damages incurred during the war
and did not address military sexual slavery, it has withheld harsh
criticism, stating that the treaty aimed to normalize diplomatic re-
lations between the two countries.93 In not making official de-
mands for financial compensation,94 the South Korean government
has prioritized the normalization of its vulnerable relations with
Japan above retribution for crimes against its nationals.95 Despite
the South Korean government's official position, many politicians,
academics, non-governmental organizations, and former comfort
women have been much stronger advocates for the comfort
women and have made demands similar to those of the North Ko-
rean government.96
91 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 67.
92 Id. para. 72. Currently, Japanese middle school and high school textbooks
for history and civics only contain one- to two-sentence references to comfort
women, and, still, there is a movement to have these inadequate references ex-
punged. O'Brien, supra note 72, at 16.
93 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 78.
94 Id.
95 See id. para. 79 (stating that high-ranking officials in the South Korean Min-
istry of Justice and the Office of the Public Prosecutor said it was difficult to de-
termine whether the Government of Japan actually had legal responsibility to
compensate for crimes committed fifty years ago).
96 Id. para. 86. Korean women's groups issued a joint statement demanding
the following from the Japanese government:
1. [T]he Japanese government acknowledge the fact that [the military]
forced Korean women to accompany troops as comfort women;
2. the Japanese government issue an official apology for these practices;
3. the Japanese government disclose all acts of brutality [committed by
the government or military];
4. a memorial to the people victimized be erected;
5. survivors or their families be compensated; and
6. in order to prevent the recurrence of these wrongs, the facts be taught
as a part of history education.
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Regardless of such international pressure and evidence indicat-
ing that the Japanese Imperial Army was responsible for the estab-
lishment and control of the comfort stations, the Japanese govern-
ment has continued to reject all legal obligations towards former
comfort women.97 It has, however, accepted moral responsibility
and some Japanese officials have issued apologies.98
4. VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Japan firmly contends that it is not legally liable for the comfort
station system, but there is both treaty law and customary interna-
tional law contradicting this position. In fact, the Special Rappor-
teur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights con-
cluded that the Japanese government has both a legal and a moral
obligation toward the comfort women.99 As a signatory to the In-
ternational Agreement for the Suppression of the White Slave Traf-
fic of 1904, the International Convention for the Suppression of the
White Slave Traffic of 1910, and the International Convention for
the Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children of 1921,100 Japan
violated its international treaty obligations by establishing a sys-
tem of military sexual slavery. Furthermore, the existence of these
international agreements, along with the Convention Respecting
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907,101 denotes that
there was widely accepted customary international law in effect, at
that time, prohibiting the human rights violations perpetuated by
the comfort station system.
4.1. Violations of International Treaty Law
The precautions taken by the Japanese government in recruit-
ing and transporting Japanese women to work in comfort stations
indicate that it was well aware of its duties under international
YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 34 (citing YUN JONG-OK, ET AL., CHOSENJIN jOSEI GA MITA
"IANFU MONDAI" [THE "COMFORT WOMAN" ISSUE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF KOREAN
WOMEN] 255 (1992)).
97 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 92.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. para. 102.
101 Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter Hague IV].
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law. 02 The International Convention for the Suppression of White
Slave Traffic of 1910 made it criminal to traffic under-aged women
for prostitution, regardless of consent, and to traffic adult women
for prostitution by fraudulent or coercive means.103 In addition,
the International Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic of
Women and Children of 1921 not only banned the trafficking of
women and children but also imposed the affirmative duty to pre-
vent it.104 Both treaties, which Japan ratified, included provisions
that permitted countries from excluding their colonies from the
scope of these laws; 105 these are the loopholes that Japan has at-
tempted to utilize to avoid legal liability.
Japan denies all liability for trafficking in comfort women from
its colonized territories, such as Korea and Taiwan, invoking Arti-
cle 14 of the 1921 Convention which excludes colonies from the
scope of the Convention.0 6 However, these treaties were clearly
enacted to eliminate the precise conduct that the comfort station
system encouraged -human trafficking, rape, and slavery. The
loopholes in the treaties were most likely created to exempt the
colonies from the application of certain insignificant or irrelevant
provisions, and, admittedly, they should have been more carefully
worded. However, a reading of these oversights as "colonial 'safe
harbors' for the sexual slave trade is a perverse one that altogether
violates the spirit of the [19211 Suppression Convention" 10 7 and the
1910 Convention. Even assuming that the colonial exemptions ap-
plied in this situation, Japan still violated the treaties. Because the
ships of a State are considered to be equivalent to State territory it-
self,108 Japan may exempt the kidnappings and coerced recruit-
102 See YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 58-59 (describing Japan's awareness of the
inappropriate recruitment methods).
103 Id. at 156 (quoting Article 1 and Article 2 of the International Convention
for the Suppression of White Slave Traffic of 1910).
104 Yu, supra note 86, at 531.
105 Article 11 of the 1910 treaty requires the signatory to submit, in writing, its
desire to apply the treaty's law in its colonies, and Article 14 of the 1921 treaty
permits a signatory to opt out of the treaty as it applies to its colonies. YOSHIAKI,
supra note 1, at 157.
106 Id. See Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 102 (stating that Japan's
claim that Korean women are exempt under Article 14 implies that all non-Korean
comfort women would have the right to claim that Japan had violated its obliga-
tion under this Convention).
107 Yu, supra note 86, at 531.
108 For a discussion of the status of a State's ships, see S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (1927), available at http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij
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ments that occurred on colonial soil, but as the comfort women
boarded Japanese ships, the exemptions were lost.1°9 Finally, Japan
relies heavily on Article 14 to justify the acts that occurred in its
colonies, but this only reinforces the argument that military cap-
ture and transport of comfort women from all non-colonized Japa-
nese territories, such as the Philippines, were indeed violations of
the 1921 Convention.110
4.2. Violations of Customary International Law
By 1932, the year Japan created its first comfort station, the in-
ternational community had already established extensive custom-
ary law prohibiting slavery and the other human rights violations
committed by Japan. The 1904, 1910, and 1921 treaties for the Sup-
pression of the White Slave Traffic and Traffic in Women and
Children prohibited the trafficking of comfort women, and the
1926 Slavery Convention, which Japan never ratified, prohibited
the practice of slavery and created the duty to prohibit the slave
trade."' These agreements serve dual purposes - they are treaty
law among the nations that ratified them, and irrespective of Ja-
pan's ratification, they are codifications of the existing customary
international law that condemned any form of slavery and human
trafficking. The core elements of the comfort station system-
coercive recruitment, forceful abduction, unspeakable violence
used against resistance or attempts to escape, forced sexual labor
/eng/cases/lotuslaw.htm. The opinion states:
[A] ship on the high seas is assimilated to the territory of the State the
flag of which it flies, for, just as in its own territory, that State exercises
its authority, upon it, and no other State may do so... a ship is placed in
the same position as national territory.., it follows that what occurs on
board a vessel on the high seas must be regarded as if it occurred on the
territory of the State whose flag the ship flies.
Id. See also YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 159 (stating that Japanese ships can be con-
sidered equivalent to Japanese territory under international law).
109 The International Commission of Jurists ("IC]'") stated that once Korean
women were removed from the Korean peninsula to Japan, the 1921 Convention
became applicable to them as well. Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 102.
"The ICJ also points out that many former comfort women testified that when
they were transported from Korea by ship, the ships made a stop on the Japanese
mainland." YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 159-60. The stops on the mainland would
also destroy Article 14's exemption, because Japan transported women directly
from its territory.
110 Yu, supra note 86, at 531.
I1l Id. at 531; YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 160-61.
20031
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
without compensation-comprise what can only be deemed a sys-
tem of sexual slavery. Japan challenges this characterization, stat-
ing that the women were not slaves because the government did
not exercise powers of ownership over them.112 It is unclear how
Japan defines slavery, but authorities on human rights and interna-
tional law properly reject this objection and maintain that Japan
violated customary international laws by making comfort women
their sexual slaves.113
The Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, signed at the Hague in 1907, is another source of customary
international law that protects "family honour and rights [and] the
lives of persons." 14 Although Japan ratified the treaty in 1911, the
treaty stipulated that if all the parties in a conflict were not signato-
ries at the time of the conflict, then none would be bound by it.115
Such was the case during World War IL but the Convention's pro-
visions were nevertheless applicable to Japan because by 1939, the
Convention was "recognized by all civilized nations and ... recog-
nized as being declaratory of the laws and customs of war."116 The
broad language of the 1907 Hague Convention leaves little room
112 See Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 7 (citing the 1926 Slavery
Convention's definition of slavery as "the status or condition of a person over
whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised").
113 The Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights disagrees with Japan's position and "holds the opinion that the practice of
'comfort women' should be considered a clear case of sexual slavery and a slav-
ery-like practice in accordance with the approach adopted by relevant interna-
tional human rights bodies and mechanisms." Coomaraswamy Report, supra note
30, para. 8. See Yu, supra note 86, at 531-32 (stating that the International Agree-
ment for the Suppression of the White Slave Traffic and the Slavery Convention
"suggest the existence of general principles and state practice condemning sexual
slavery that may have acquired the force of custom before World War II").
114 Hague IV, supra note 101, Annex, art. 46,36 Stat. 2277.
115 Hague IV, supra note 101, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2277.
116 Yu, supra note 86, at 532 (quoting Karen Parker & Jennifer F. Chew, Com-
pensation for Japan's World War I War-Rape Victims, 17 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 497, 516 (1994)). "The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg con-
cluded that the provisions of the Hague Conventions [of 1907] are customary in-
ternational law." LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 159 (2d ed. 1998). The
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
of 1949 is additional evidence that the 1907 Hague Convention was accepted as
customary law, in that it is considered to be a reiteration of the customary law
principles found in the Hague Convention. Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 27, 75 U.N.T.S.
287. See also Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 98 (pointing out that Arti-
cle 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention emphasizes the principle that rape during
times of war is an international war crime).
[24:2
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol24/iss2/4
COMFORTING THE COMFORT WOMEN
for debate as to whether Japan violated customary international
law. Kidnapping and coercing daughters, sisters, and wives away
from their families to be raped and murdered by the military was
disrespect of the grossest kind for family honor and human life and
undoubtedly constituted war crimes that violated customary inter-
national laws.
Not only should Japan be held liable under international law
for its crimes against individual comfort women, it should also be
held liable for attempting to conceal the true nature of its role in
creating and operating the comfort station system. "International
law places affirmative duties on states to investigate and prosecute
grave violations of human rights," 117 and Japan failed to uphold
this duty. First, not only did Japan make no attempt to prosecute
the civilian procurers and station operators that sustained the com-
fort station system, it actually encouraged and employed them,
making them agents of the State. Second, destroying documents
about the comfort stations greatly discouraged or prevented the
State and any other potential plaintiffs from investigating criminal
behavior and prosecuting responsible parties. The Japanese gov-
ernment's recent reluctance to formally investigate the matter and
its complete denial of legal responsibility constitute a breach of the
duty to investigate and prosecute. Finally, the destruction of re-
cords about the comfort station system is also a telltale sign of Ja-
pan's guilty conscience. If the system would not have imposed any
liability and Japan was truly confident that it had not violated in-
ternational laws, what reason could there have been to conceal or
destroy records?
4.3. Violations of Jus Cogens Norms
The most serious offense Japan committed by creating the com-
fort station system is the violation of jus cogens norms. Jus cogens
are peremptory norms of general international law that are "ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of States as
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general in-
117 Yu, supra note 86, at 533. The International Convention for the Suppres-
sion of the Traffic in Women and Children of 1921, the Slavery Convention of
1926, and the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of
1907 placed an affirmative duty on the state to prosecute prohibited acts as well
not commit them. See supra text accompanying notes 104,111, and 115.
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ternational law having the same character." 118 "As such, theoreti-
cally, jus cogens norms enjoy the highest authority in international
law and are binding on all states, even in the absence of their con-
sent to be bound."119 Due to the controversy regarding how to
identify jus cogens, there are few norms that have reached the
status of jus cogens. 2o Entrenched in natural law theories, the con-
cept of jus cogens assumes that some acts do not require treaties to
be banned because they are universally considered to be the grav-
est injuries and, likewise, no treaties are necessary to prosecute
wrongdoers. For example, enslavement has been accepted as a jus
cogens violation, regardless of who commits it. Rape and sexual
slavery can be considered torture, a jus cogens violation, but inter-
national law also recognizes sexual slavery and sexual violence as
jus cogens war crimes themselves.121 With the exception of Japan,
the international community declares that the comfort station sys-
tem was systematized sexual slavery, 22 and, thus, a violation of jus
cogens norms. Having committed what the international commu-
nity considers to be the most heinous kind of crime, how can Japan
continue to shrug off its legal responsibilities to its victims?
4.4. Japan Denies Obligations Under International Law
In denying legal responsibility for creating the comfort station
system, Japan contends that irrespective of whether it violated in-
ternational law, former comfort women cannot pursue legal reme-
dies because international law applies only to States and not to in-
dividuals123  This assertion, however, fails to recognize the
progress that has been made in international human rights law.
118 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), May 23, 1969, art. 53,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
119 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 185.
120 See MALONE, supra note 116, at 37 (explaining that there are few rules
which are generally accepted as peremptory norms due to the difficulty in identi-
fying them). Given differences in values and social norms amongst all the differ-
ent cultures and countries, it is understandably difficult for the international com-
munity to identify norms that are held universally.
121 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 185-86.
122 See Japan Shrugs Off Sex Slave Ruling, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 5, 2001
[hereinafter Sex Slave Ruling] (stating that the members of the mock tribunal that
held Japan guilty of forcing women to work as sex slaves included a coalition of
women's groups, human rights campaigners, and international legal experts),
available at 2001 WL 25078857.
123 Yu, supra note 86, at 533-34.
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While the traditional role of international law was to govern the re-
lations between states, the current prevailing view is that the inter-
national law of human rights applies to individuals, regardless of
their nationalities, whether they are seeking protection or being
prosecuted. 24 Japan's claim that comfort women cannot avail
themselves of international law is clearly wrong.
Japan further argues that, even if legitimate, suits brought by
former comfort women cannot be adjudicated because prior trea-
ties have settled all war claims against the State. Japan relies heav-
ily on the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, between Japan and the
Allied Powers, and the 1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Prob-
lems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Coopera-
tion between Japan and South Korea.125 However, Japan's argu-
ment that these treaties bar claims for reparations is not
substantiated by the content of them, nor by international law au-
thorities, for several reasons. 26 First, at the time of the San Fran-
cisco Peace Treaty, South Korea was still a colony of Japan and,
therefore, not a signatory barred from bringing subsequent ac-
tion. 27 Second, neither the San Francisco Peace Treaty nor the 1965
treaty with South Korea were intended to cover individual claims
against Japan resulting from war crimes or crimes against human-
ity.128
According to United Nations Special Rapporteur Gay McDou-
gall, the San Francisco Treaty barred the Allied nations from mak-
ing any future claims for reparations, but it did not prohibit the na-
tionals of Allied nations from doing so.129 Regardless, since South
124 See MALONE, supra note 116, at 116-17 (providing a brief history of the evo-
lution of international law as applied to individuals). Malone attributes the mod-
em concept of international human rights law to the world's reaction to the Holo-
caust and other Nazi war crimes. The establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal
demonstrated that human rights were a matter of international concern not to be
left solely to individual states. Id. See, e.g., Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30,
paras. 110-11 (stating that international conventions define the rights of the indi-
vidual vis-A-vis the state and, therefore, are further evidence that individuals are
both subject to international law and entitled to its protection); Yu, supra note 86,
at 533-34 (discussing the application of international law to individuals, particu-
larly in the area of human rights).
125 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, paras. 106-07.
126 See id., para. 107 ("The International Commission of Jurists... states that
the treaties referred to by the Japanese Government never intended to include
claims made by individuals for inhumane treatment.").
127 HicKs, supra note 12, at 170.
128 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 108.
129 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 189.
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Korea was not an Allied nation at that time, using the San Fran-
cisco Treaty as a defense against South Korean comfort women's
claims is entirely irrelevant. There is a bilateral treaty between
South Korea and Japan settling war-related claims. However, the
1965 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Prop-
erty and Claims and on Economic Cooperation, as the name indi-
cates, is limited in scope to economic and property claims between
the two governments. 30 This agreement was not intended to settle
issues of human rights violations or claims brought by individuals.
The documents that South Korea presented during its negotiations
with Japan specifically excluded claims for personal injuries result-
ing from international law violations committed by Japan,131 dem-
onstrating that the issue was left open.
5. HISTORY OF COMFORT WOMEN LITIGATION
In March 1948, the Batavia Military Tribunal convicted eleven
out of thirteen charged defendants-Japanese officers and comfort
station operators-for committing war crimes against Dutch
women forced to work in comfort stations in the Dutch East In-
dies.132 The Dutch military court found seven officers and four ci-
vilian comfort station operators guilty.
Three of the officers were convicted of rounding up women
for the purpose of forced prostitution. Four officers and all
of the comfort station operators were convicted of coerced
prostitution. Four officers, including the commander of the
Southern Army's Officer Candidate Corps, were convicted
of rape. The fact that the women were raped at the comfort
stations was acknowledged .... The major who was in
charge of setting up the comfort stations was given the
death penalty (execution by firing squad) .... The colonel
who was considered to have played a central role in the
planning of the comfort stations returned to Japan, but
130 Coomaraswamy Report, supra note 30, para. 104.
131 Arakawa, supra note 4, at 188-89.
132 See YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 163, 171-73 (describing the details of the rul-
ing of the Batavia Military Tribunal in the case of the Semarang comfort stations).
Semarang is on the island of Java in the Dutch East Indies, which is now Indone-
sia. Id. at 163.
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upon learning that he was being pursued by the Dutch, he
committed suicide in January 1947.133
The Batavia trials received very little international attention,
because the names of both the victims and the accused were to re-
main sealed until 2025, but in 1992, details of the case finally be-
came public. 34 The significance of the Dutch court's ruling is not
to be underestimated. The convictions were an unambiguous mes-
sage to Japan that enforced prostitution, or rape, and the forcible
recruitment of women for the purpose of prostitution were war
crimes under international law that called for the harshest of penal-
ties. The outcome of this case also indicates that there was suffi-
cient evidence, at least at that point, to hold that the military was in
control and was responsible for the crimes committed to further
the comfort station system; this was definitely not a civilian opera-
tion as Japan had claimed.
Forty-three years later, on December 6, 1991, arguments began
in a Tokyo court in the first comfort women's case brought in
Japanese courts.135 Three Korean former comfort women, led by
Kim Hak-sun, brought claims against Japan and finally brought in-
ternational attention to the comfort women's plight.136 Since then,
more survivors have come forth to file suits in Japanese courts, but
none have been successful thus far.137 Given Japan's firm position
that it bears no legal responsibility for the comfort station system,
it is unlikely that its courts will rule against the interests of the
State in the future.
In December 2000, four judges aiming to compensate for the
Allied Powers' failure to prosecute Japan after the war convened as
133 Id. at 173.
134 HICKS, supra note 12, at 168. The Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese newspaper,
acquired the court documents and published them in detail in 1992, and the Dutch
government, while not releasing court documents, did publish a report entitled,
"Report of a Study of Dutch Government Documents on the Forced Prostitution
of Dutch Women in the Dutch East Indies During the Japanese Occupation."
YOSHIAKI, supra note 1, at 163-64.
135 See HICKS, supra note 12, at 199 (describing the first comfort women's case
in Japan, which later became formally known as the Asia-Pacific War Korean Vic-
tims Compensation Claim Case).
136 Barry A. Fisher, Japan's Postwar Compensation Litigation, 22 WHITTIER L.
REv. 35,44-46 (2000).
137 See Vanderweert, supra note 18, at 160-63 (discussing cases that have been
brought in Japanese courts only to be dismissed or ruled against).
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the Women's International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial
of Japan's Military Sexual Slavery to hear the case of The Prosecu-
tors and the Peoples of the Asia-Pacific Region v. Emperor Hirohito et al.
and the Government of Japan.'38 Because it was not created by a state
or intergovernmental organization, the judgment of this mock war
crimes tribunal is not legally binding,139 but the "power of the Tri-
bunal, like so many human rights initiatives, lies in its capacity to
examine the evidence and develop an enduring historical re-
cord." 40 Applying the international laws in effect from 1937 to
1945, the tribunal found Emperor Hirohito and nine named offi-
cials guilty of rape and sexual slavery.'41 It also found the Japanese
government liable for harms inflicted by creating, building, man-
aging, and promoting the comfort station system and for engaging
in organized attempts to hide the system.142 The judgment called
for a formal apology, adequate victim compensation, creation of a
memorial in honor of the comfort women, and the establishment of
mechanisms for thorough investigation of the comfort station sys-
tem 43 This panel of international jurists, like other international
law authorities that have investigated the comfort station system,
also rejected Japan's position that postwar treaties settled all war
claims. Specifically citing the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the
Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property
and Claims Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, among oth-
ers, "the Tribunal [found] that the Peace Treaties [were] not appli-
cable in the current context as states cannot agree by treaty to
waive the liability of another state for crimes against humanity."'144
Although it is unenforceable, the Tribunal's decision gives the
comfort women's claims indisputable legitimacy. The "result was
what might be called the giving of final notice by the international
138 Women's Tribunal, supra note 3.
139 Sex Slave Ruling, supra note 122.
140 Women's Tribunal, supra note 3, para. 6.
141 Ceres P. Doyo, Judgment in The Hague-Stepping Into 'The Breach,'
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER, Jan. 3, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7069808.
142 Id.; Japanese Gov't Urged Not to 'Pass Historical Baggage to Posterity,' WORLD
NEws CONNECTION, Dec. 6, 2001 [hereinafter Historical Baggage], available at 2001
WL 31644456; Sex Slave Ruling, supra note 122.
143 Doyo, supra note 141; Historical Baggage, supra note 142; Sex Slave Ruling,
supra note 122.
144 Women's Tribunal, supra note 3, para. 29.
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community with the demand that the Japanese government take
action to make amends."145
6. HWANG V. JAPAN: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
6.1. Comfort Women Bring Suit in U.S. Court
On September 18, 2000, fifteen former comfort women from
South Korea, China, the Philippines, and Taiwan filed a class ac-
tion lawsuit against Japan in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.146 In Hwang v. Japan, the plaintiffs alleged
that the Japanese military tortured and forced them into sexual
slavery.147 They demanded the disclosure of all documents and re-
cords related to the comfort station system, as well as compensa-
tory and punitive damages.148 The former comfort women argued
that, by establishing a system of sexual slavery, Japan committed
torts in violation of the Law of Nations and international and do-
mestic laws against forced prostitution and rape.149 The comfort
women, who are all foreign nationals, were able to file suit in a U.S.
federal court by claiming a cause of action under the Alien Torts
Claim Act ("ATCA"), which states: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States."15°
Although the ATCA had been enacted in 1789, foreign nation-
als rarely used U.S. courts as a forum to sue other foreign nationals
or sovereigns due to jurisdictional restrictions. The ATCA had be-
come near-dead letter law, having been invoked in only a few
cases, until Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala'51 rescued the statute from obscu-
rity in 1980. In this seminal case, Joel Filartiga, a citizen of the Re-
public of Paraguay, sued Americo Norberto Pefia-Irala, the former
Inspector General of Police of Paraguay, for the kidnap, torture,
145 Historical Baggage, supra note 142.
146 Pl.'s Compl., Hwang v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Hwang Complaint] (No. 00-CV-2288, renumbered No. 00-CV-2233), available at
http://www.cmht.com/casewatch/cases/comfortwomen-cmpl.pdf.
147 Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 54.
148 Hwang Complaint, supra note 146, at 33.
149 Id. at 32.
150 Alien Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2001).
151 Filartiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
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and murder of his son.15 2 Here, the Second Circuit used the ATCA
to hold that federal jurisdiction was appropriate because "deliber-
ate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human
rights, regardless of the nationality of the parties."15 3 Since Filar-
tiga, federal courts have adopted this broad reading of the ATCA
and foreign nationals have successfully adjudicated claims against
human rights violators in U.S. courts. 54
Unfortunately for plaintiffs attempting to sue a foreign sover-
eign in U.S. courts, like those in Hwang, what the ATCA gives with
one hand, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 55 ("FSIA") often
takes away with the other. The FSIA provides presumptive im-
munity for foreign States from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts unless
the plaintiff can prove that the State is not entitled to immunity
under one of the FSIA's enumerated exceptions.156 In Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess,57 the Supreme Court explained the relation-
ship between the FSIA and ATCA. The Court held that the FSIA
provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state in U.S. courts.158 This severely undercuts the applicability of
the ATCA, because it can be used to confer jurisdiction to foreign
states only under the limited circumstances in which they are not
granted immunity by the FSIA. Thus, in Hwang, the D.C. District
Court could only properly adjudicate the suit against Japan if the
comfort women could prove that the FSIA did not apply.
In Hwang v. Japan, the comfort women urged the court not to
grant Japan immunity based on the first two exceptions of the
FSIA159 Under these exceptions, a foreign State will be subject to
152 Id.
153 Id. at 876.
154 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117
S. Ct. 96 (1996) (asserting torture claims against an official of the Ethiopian gov-
ernment by former Ethiopian prisoners); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995) (using the ATCA to exercise jurisdiction and find liability in a case involving
war crimes and crimes against humanity); Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th
Cir. 1992) (asserting a wrongful death claim by a Philippine citizen for the torture
death of her son).
155 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (2001).
156 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07 for the list of enumerated exceptions to presump-
tive immunity.
157 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
158 Id. at 434.
159 The plaintiffs also invoked the noncommercial tort exception of the FSIA,
which bars immunity in cases in which money damages are sought against a for-
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the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States or of the states in
cases:
(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity ei-
ther explicitly or by implication, notwithstanding any
withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may pur-
port to effect except in accordance with the terms of the
waiver; [or]
(2) in which the action is based on a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state; or upon
an act performed in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon
an act outside the territory of the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state else-
where and that act causes a direct effect in the United
States.160
According to the plaintiffs, Japan had explicitly waived immu-
nity by signing the Potsdam Declaration after World War IL Spe-
cifically, the plaintiffs submitted the following language from the
Potsdam Declaration as Japan's explicit waiver:
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be ensla[v]ed as a
race or destroyed as a nation, but [stern] justice shall be
[meted] out to all war criminals, including those who have
visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Gov-
ernment shall remove all obstacles to the revival and
strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese
people. The freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought
eign state for personal injury or death occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of the state while acting within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. §
1605(a)(5) (2001). The court refused to consider this, however, because the plain-
tiffs raised the noncommercial tort exception for the first time during the oral ar-
gument on Japan's motion to dismiss. Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d. at 57 n.2.
160 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(2) (2001).
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as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall
be established.' 61
Because the Supreme Court has construed the Potsdam Decla-
ration as Japan's acquiescence to be subject to criminal trials for
violations of the law of war, the plaintiffs argue that Japan has also
waived immunity for civil suits in U.S. courts.162 The plaintiffs also
posited that violations of jus cogens norms constitute an implied
waiver of sovereign immunity.163
In the alternative, the plaintiffs asserted that the comfort station
system fell within the FSIA's commercial activity exception. The
plaintiffs reasoned that the comfort stations were commercial ac-
tivities because they were revenue-generating, State-supervised
brothels. 64 Furthermore, these commercial activities had direct ef-
fects upon the United States because: 1) stations were established
in Guam and the Philippines, which were United States territories
at the time; 2) after World War II, Japanese territories occupied by
the United States military became a part of the United States; and
3) United States servicemen also used the comfort women after the
war.165
6.2. With the Bush Administration's Support, Japan's Motion to Dis-
miss Is Granted
Japan responded to the comfort women's complaint by moving
to dismiss it on the following grounds:
1) that Japan enjoys sovereign immunity; 2) that the court
lacks personal jurisdiction over Japan; 3) that this action
presents a political question; 4) that even if jurisdiction ex-
ists this case should be dismissed on the grounds of forum
nonconveniens; 5) that the international comity of nations
161 Potsdam Declaration, July 26,1945, para. 10, available at http://list.room
.ne.jp/-lawtext/1945Potsdam-English.html. See also Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 59
(citing the same language relied upon by the plaintiffs as Japan's explicit waiver).
162 See Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (quoting the Supreme Court's reading of
the Potsdam Declaration in In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)).
163 See id. at 60 (analyzing the plaintiffs' contentions of jus cogens violations).
164 See id. at 61 (noting the court's analysis of the plaintiffs' contention that the
comfort stations qualified under the commercial activity exception).
165 See id. (positing that post-war usage qualifies as having a direct effect on
the United States).
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requires dismissal; 6) that the statute of limitations has ex-
pired; and 7) that under the ATCA these claims should be
dismissed.166
Japan's motion challenged the legal sufficiency of the plaintiffs'
claims; however, it did not challenge the factual basis of the allega-
tions themselves.167 Instead, Japan focused on persuading the
court that the plaintiffs' claims presented a nonjusticiable political
question because, first, war reparations claims are nonjusticiable as
a matter of law and, second, individuals may not assert war-
related claims except as authorized by a treaty of peace.168
Although it is not the position of the United States that war
reparations claims are per se nonjusticiable, on April 27, 2001, the
U.S. State Department did issue a Statement of Interest advising
the court to dismiss the case, arguing that it involved a political
question that rendered the plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable.169 The
United States stated that, in this case, past treaties, namely the San
Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 treaty between Japan and Ko-
rea, addressed and were aimed at settling all war claims against
Japan.170 Taking its cue from the executive branch, the court
granted Japan's motion to dismiss on October 4, 2001, holding that
Japan was entitled to sovereign immunity under the FSIA and that
the plaintiffs' claims presented a nonjusticiable political ques-
tion.171
166 See id. at 55 n.1 (detailing Japan's grounds for a motion to dismiss).
167 See id. at 56 (stating that the court assumed the allegations were true for
purposes of determining the applicability of FSIA exceptions, since Japan only
challenged their legal sufficiency at that stage).
168 See id. at 64 n.9 (providing Japan's arguments for dismissal).
169 Id.; Nelson Chung, Demonstration Held in Support of'Comfort Women's' Suit,
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, July 24, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2896967.
170 The court blindly accepted the State Department's Statement of Interest,
which stated that the "Treaty of Peace with Japan resolved all 'claims of the Allied
Powers and their nationals arising out of any actions taken by Japan and its na-
tionals....'" Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 67 (emphasis added) (quoting the Treaty
of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, art. 14(b), T.I.A.S. No. 2490). Fur-
thermore, while acknowledging that comfort women may not have been men-
tioned in subsequent treaties between Japan, Korea, and China, the court claims
"the series of treaties signed after the war was clearly aimed at resolving all war
claims against Japan." Id.
171 Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 67.
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6.2.1. The Court Grants Japan Sovereign Immunity Under the
FSIA
In its decision, the court granted immunity to Japan, rejecting
the plaintiffs' argument that either the waiver or commercial activ-
ity exceptions applied. In first addressing the waiver exception,
the court explained that an explicit waiver will be found only if a
foreign state issued a clear, intentional, and unambiguous waiver
of immunity or intention to subject itself to civil suits in U.S.
courts.172 However, there is nothing in the Potsdam Declaration
that amounts to such a specific waiver, and the court refused to
find an explicit waiver in it. This could not have been an unex-
pected result for the comfort women in light of the Supreme
Court's reading of the waiver exception in Amerada Hess. In that
case, responding to the claim that entering into international trea-
ties with the United States created an explicit waiver, the Supreme
Court stated that it did not "see how a foreign state can waive its
immunity under § 1605(a)(1) by signing an international agreement
that contains no mention of a waiver of immunity to suit in United
States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the
United States." 73
Case law also unquestionably undermines the comfort
women's argument that Japan implicitly waived immunity by
committing jus cogens violations. In Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany, the plaintiff sought to recover money damages for the in-
juries he suffered and the slave labor he performed while a pris-
oner in Nazi concentration camps. 74 The D.C. Circuit held that the
'jus cogens theory of implied waiver is incompatible with the inten-
tionality requirement implicit in § 1605(a)(1)." 175 While acknowl-
edging Princz, the plaintiffs failed to offer any contrary case law,
but asked the court to simply disregard the D.C. Circuit's hold-
ing. 76 The court understandably refused and upheld precedent.
Finally, the court agreed with Japan and the United States that
the comfort women's claims did not arise in connection with a
commercial activity'77 and held that none of the exceptions to the
172 Id. at 59.
173 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 442-43.
174 Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166,1168 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
175 Id. at 1174.
176 Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 60.
177 Id. at 63.
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FSIA were applicable. Using the Supreme Court's explanation of
commercial activity as provided in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
Inc.,178 the court focused on whether the comfort stations involved
the type of transactions used by private parties for commerce.
Even though the comfort station system generated revenues and
involved private entrepreneurs, the court held that the conduct of
the Japanese military was "unquestionably barbaric, but cer-
tainly.. . not commercial in nature."179 The court reasoned that the
comfort station system depended on government resources and
that private players in the market, who generally do not have ac-
cess to such resources, could not have engaged in the conduct of
the Japanese military in creating and operating its system of mili-
tary sexual slavery. Ultimately, the "challenged conduct 'boils
down' to an abuse -albeit an extremely outrageous and inhumane
one -of Japan's military power, an activity that is 'peculiarly sov-
ereign in nature."' 180 Having concluded that the comfort station
system was not a commercial activity within the meaning of the
FSIA, the court declined to determine whether it caused a direct ef-
fect in the United States.' 8'
6.2.2. Comfort Women's Claims Held Nonjusticiable
After determining that none of the FSIA exceptions applied and
that Japan was entitled to immunity, the court agreed with Japan
and the United States that the case required dismissal because it
involved a nonjusticiable political question.182 Despite the fact that
alien plaintiffs have brought successful suits against foreign gov-
ernment officials for violating human rights in the past,183 the court
stated that it is:
well-established that '[t]he conduct of the foreign relations
of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislative -'the political' - departments of
178 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992) (ex-
plaining that the issue is "whether the particular actions that the foreign state per-
forms (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of actions by which a pri-
vate party engages in 'trade and traffic or commerce"').
179 Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 63.
180 See id. at 64 (quoting Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 362 (1993)).
181 Id. at 64 n.8.
182 Id. at 64.
183 See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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the government, and the propriety of what may be done in
the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial
inquiry or decision." 84
However, the court admitted that not all cases implicating for-
eign relations present political questions, e.g., the judiciary does
have the authority to construe treaties and executive agreements. 185
Using this authority would not have been unreasonable in this case
given that the State Department asserted the plaintiffs' claims were
nonjusticiable relying primarily on the notion that past treaties re-
solved the comfort women's claims. Explaining that it did not
have the expertise or the means to adjudicate the case,186 the court
chose not to exercise its authority to interpret treaties and dis-
missed the comfort women's complaint.
6.3. Trade Relations Motivate the Bush Administration's Support for
Japan
What is especially troubling about the Bush Administration's
rationale for supporting the dismissal of the comfort women's
claims in Hwang v. Japan is its claim that past treaties, signed after
World War II, were addressed and aimed at settling all war claims
against Japan. Though the D.C. District Court may have accepted
this argument, experts on international law disagree.187 In 1998,
the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities reported
that Japan's
184 See Hwang, 172 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (quoting Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)).
185 Id. at 65 (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S.
221,229 (1986)).
186 The court justifies its dismissal by stating that resolution of the plaintiffs'
claims would be hindered by a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it" and the necessity of moving beyond its judicial exper-
tise. Id. at 66 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
187 Gay J. McDougall, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual
Slavery and Slavery-like Practices During Armed Conflict, U.N. ESCOR, 50th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 6, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (1998) [hereinafter
McDougall Report], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf
/7fba5363523b20cdc12565a800312a4b/3d25270b5fa3ea998025665f0032f220?Open
Document (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
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attempt to escape liability through the operation of [the
1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 Settlement]
fails on two counts: (a) Japan's direct involvement in the
establishment of the rape camps was concealed when the
treaties were written, a crucial fact that must now prohibit
on equity grounds any attempt by Japan to rely on these
treaties to avoid liability; and (b) the plain language of the
treaties indicates that they were not intended to foreclose
claims for compensation by individuals for harms commit-
ted by the Japanese military in violation of human rights or
humanitarian law.188
Assuming the Special Rapporteur's report is a more objective
reading of the treaties at issue, the Bush Administration's reading
is simply wrong; its Statement of Interest was not based on an in-
terest in upholding international treaty law.
The more plausible grounds for the Bush Administration's po-
sition can be found in its statement that "finding Japan liable could
interfere with U.S.-Japanese relations."189 The economic relation-
ship between the United States and Japan is considered to be one
of the most important and complex in the world.190 Given Japan's
recent financial difficulties, the United States has taken a very ac-
tive role in attempting to promote Japanese economic reform and
growth through compliance with existing bilateral agreements.' 9'
For example, the White House released a statement outlining the
structure of the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth,
which has the objective of promoting
[slustainable growth in both countries as well as the world
by addressing such issues as sound macroeconomic poli-
cies, structural and regulatory reform, financial and corpo-
rate restructuring, foreign direct investment, and open
188 Id. at app. para. 55.
189 Gerona-Adkins, supra note 19.
190 Kristin Leigh Case, Prevention and Settlement of Economic Disputes Between
Japan and the United States: Part I: General Legal and Institutional Framework: An
Overview of Fifteen Years of United States -Japanese Economic Relations, 16 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 11 (1999).
191 See id. at 26-27 (explaining that the Japanese recession prompted the U.S.
to pressure Japan to revitalize its economy and focus on bilateral economic re-
forms).
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markets and by providing a structure for cooperation and
engagement on bilateral, regional and global economic and
trade issues.192
The Bush Administration is undoubtedly nervous that allowing
its economic partner to be dragged into its courts and be held liable
may hinder the growth of this relationship. Coincidentally, or not,
on the same day the State Department issued its Statement of In-
terest to the D.C. District Court, it also released a statement on in-
creasing American foreign direct investment in Japan.193
Developing fruitful economic relations with Japan is not an
unwarranted goal for the Bush Administration. Nor is it inaccu-
rate to say that trade relations with a foreign state involve political
questions which the judiciary lacks expertise in answering. How-
ever, the Administration could have, and should have, made it
clear that it was invoking the political question doctrine because
the foreign relations at stake were economic relations with Japan
and not because the comfort women's claims were invalid. By
concluding that past treaties settled all war claims against Japan,
the United States completely discredited the comfort women's
plight. The State Department focused its position on the jurisdic-
tional issue, 94 but one can infer from its interpretation of past trea-
ties that it has adopted the Japanese view that comfort women are
not legally entitled, even if they are morally entitled, to compensa-
tion.
7. CONCLUSION
Even if it were possible for federal courts to establish jurisdic-
tion and adjudicate Hwang v. Japan, or any other comfort women's
case, the question remains as to whether an American court could
provide the desired remedies. Comfort women plaintiffs have
192 Press Release, The White House, White House on U.S.-Japan Economic
Partnership for Growth (June 30, 2001), at http://usembassy.state.gov/tokyo
/wwwhus0030.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
193 Department of State, Washington File: Text: Larson Says More Foreign Di-
rect Investment Would Help Japan (Apr. 27, 2001), available at http://www.usis-
australia.gov/hyper/2001/0427/epf504.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2003).
194 See Bill Miller, U.S. Resists 'Comfort Women' Suit, WASH. POST, May 14,
2001, at A19 (quoting an unnamed State Department official as saying "the United
States government position... is that the court does not have jurisdiction and
may not hear the case").
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sought non-monetary remedies in addition to reparations, includ-
ing "Japan's acknowledgement of its moral and legal culpability, a
formal apology, full disclosure of all facts, and accurate revision of
Japanese history textbooks to reflect Japan's conduct during World
War II."195 These are remedies even Japanese courts would have
difficulty providing, as they would probably require legislative ac-
tion.196 Regardless of how U.S. courts or international tribunals
rule on comfort women's cases, cooperation from the Japanese
government would be necessary to effectuate the remedies comfort
women seek. Having consistently denied legal responsibility,
however, it is improbable that Japan will readily cooperate with
any court that finds it liable for war crimes related to the comfort
station system, irrespective of that court's jurisdiction.
What is especially frustrating for sympathizers of comfort
women is Japan's callous lack of genuine remorse. The AWF ap-
pears to be an attempt to buy comfort women's silence and end
negative publicity for the state, not an act of sincere atonement or
an admission of culpability. Even today, Japanese history text-
books, which are screened by the Japanese Education Ministry,
continue to distort or omit facts relating to atrocities committed by
Japan during World War II, including the comfort station sys-
tem.197 Until the government is willing to make full admission of
guilt and offer an earnest apology to former comfort women, no
court will be able to provide justice to them.
Accordingly, U.S. courts may not be the proper forum for the
comfort women to seek justice. However, it is not inconceivable
for the United States to censure such crimes against humanity, in
general, and Japan's comfort station system, specifically. In fact,
until the Bush Administration's recent support for Japan, comfort
women have received bipartisan support from U.S. legislators and
state legislators. 198 This Comment does not suggest that the execu-
tive branch was not entitled to dictate foreign policy and request
the Hwang court to dismiss the case. However, it does find fault
195 Yu, supra note 86, at 537.
1% See id. (explaining that Japanese courts do not have the equitable powers
of common law courts to fashion such non-monetary remedies, but other branches
of government might).
'97 Id. at 539.
198 Gerona-Adkins, supra note 19 (discussing two resolutions introduced to
the U.S. House of Representatives and one that passed in the California State As-
sembly asking Japan to issue a formal apology and pay reparations to comfort
women).
20031
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
with the Administration's reasoning in requesting dismissal of the
case. The State Department could have submitted a Statement of
Interest proposing dismissal of the suit based solely on the applica-
tion of the FSIA. It is clear from the court's opinion that, even if
Hwang had not involved a political question, it would have granted
immunity to Japan and dismissed the case because neither the
waiver nor commercial activity exceptions applied. Instead, the
Statement of Interest also claimed that the plaintiffs presented a
nonjusticiable political question because past treaties addressed
and settled all war claims against Japan, and the court dismissed
the case based on these grounds.
The assertion that those treaties settled all war claims against
Japan holds no weight when measured against the consistent posi-
tion of international jurists and organizations that postwar treaties
neither addressed nor settled the comfort women's claims. For the
Bush Administration to suggest otherwise is disconcerting, because
it implies that comfort women's claims are invalid not only in U.S.
courts, but in all courts.
The United States is not obligated to protect the human rights
of foreign nationals at the cost of its economic interests and trade
relations with Japan. If holding Japan liable in U.S. courts would
do so, then granting immunity may have been the proper answer
to the question of judicial jurisdiction, and this would have suffi-
ciently protected the United States' relationship with Japan. The
Bush Administration, however, needlessly and erroneously went
too far. Instead of concluding that the United States should not
hear the comfort women's claims, it asserted that no one else
should either, and in doing so, the Bush Administration joined Ja-
pan in its vile mission to silence the voice that comfort women
have struggled for so long to find.
What is especially tragic is that many comfort women will re-
main unknown, whether it is because they are now dead or be-
cause they are unwilling to shed their veil of anonymity by ex-
pressing their outrage and demanding justice from the Japanese
government. The Women's International War Crimes Tribunal on
Japan's Military Sexual Slavery commented:
There are no museums, no graves for the unknown 'com-
fort women,' no education for future generations, and no
judgment days for the victims of Japan's military sexual
slavery. Many of the women who have come forward to
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fight for justice have died unsung heroes. While the names
inscribed in the history's pages are often those of the men
who commit the crimes, rather than the women that suffer
then [sic] ... the survivors that took the stage to tell their
stories . . . put wrong on the scaffold and truth on the
throne.199
199 Doyo, supra note 141 (quoting the Tribunal's judgment).
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